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The round-robin differential phase-shift quantum key distribution protocol provides a secure way
to exchange private information without monitoring conventional disturbances and still maintains
a high tolerance of noise, making it desirable for practical implementations of quantum key dis-
tribution. However, photon number resolving detectors are required to ensure that the detected
signals are single photons in the original protocol. Here, we adopt the detector-decoy method and
give the bounds to the fraction of detected events from single photons. Utilizing the advantages of
the protocol, we provide a practical method of performing the protocol with desirable performances
requiring only threshold single-photon detectors.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Ac,03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two legiti-
mate users, typically called Alice and Bob, to share a
common bit string with information-theoretic security
even in the presence of eavesdroppers [1, 2]. Since the
BB84 [1] protocol was proposed, tremendous progress
has been made, for example, SARG04 QKD [3], decoy-
state QKD [4, 5], measurement-device-independent QKD
[6, 7], and device-independent QKD [8], were proposed
to enhance the security of quantum communication. The
security proof of QKD, which leads to the explicit form
of the extractable secure key rate the corresponding pro-
tocol provides, is closely related to the original version
of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle [9]. It means that
any eavesdropper’s intervention acquiring the effective
private information of quantum states will lead to a dis-
turbance which can be discovered and estimated from a
randomly chosen portion of measurement results, namely,
monitoring the signal disturbance. The more disturbance
that the eavesdropper (Eve) should have caused, the less
efficient the QKD protocol will be.
Recently, Sasaki, Yamamoto, and Koashi proposed a
ground-breaking approach, a qudit-based protocol, i.e.,
the round-robin differential phase-shift QKD (RRDPS-
QKD) protocol that does not require disturbance mon-
itoring since the limit on leaked information, namely,
the portion of the sifted key subjected to privacy am-
plification, can be acquired in advance and maintains a
high tolerance of noise [10]. Since the RRDPS-QKD was
proposed, it has been studied both theoretically [11–13]
and experimentally [11, 14–16]. According to the orig-
inal protocol, the phase error estimation can be done
after Alice’s preparation in advance without considering
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Eve’s interventions, which makes it independent of the
bit error rate and thus incredibly desirable for practical
implementations of QKD. Specifically, under ideal cir-
cumstances, the RRDPS-QKD protocol can tolerate a
high bit error rate, up to almost 50%, which is signifi-
cantly different from previous QKD protocols [9], such
as the qubit-based BB84 protocol, whose bit error rate
cannot go beyond 11% based on one way classical post-
processing [17]. However, as pointed out by the authors,
a realization of this protocol requires Bob to be equipped
with photon number resolving detectors (PNR). This is a
problem that all experimental implementations of QKD
based on qubit encoding today face, the requirement of
photon-counting techniques, as their unconditional secu-
rity is based on single photon transmission, in which Al-
ice sends single photons into insecure quantum channels,
and Bob only receives single photons. Yet in practice,
this assumption cannot be satisfied due to the fact that
weak laser pulses are usually used as the source, which
occasionally include more than one photon, and that the
eavesdropper may intercept and send multiphotons to the
receiver. Therefore, for qubit-based quantum commu-
nication protocols [1–6, 18–22], the decoy state method
[4, 5] has solved the multiphoton problems at the source
with great enhancements, while squash models [23–26]
are proposed to solve problems at the detector.
In the RRDPS-QKD protocol [10], a practical vulner-
ability lies in that Bob’s measurement device requires
experimentally challenging detectors that are able to dis-
criminate between single photons from two or more pho-
tons, i.e., photon number resolving detectors. Labora-
tories are presently equipped with conventional thresh-
old photon detectors, and while actual PNR detectors
are slowly entering commercial use, they are still highly
temperature sensitive and can only resolve a limited num-
ber of photons received [27]. In fact, all experimen-
tal demonstrations of RRDPS-QKD have used threshold
single-photon detectors [11, 14–16]. Meanwhile, a recent
work suggests that with the use of threshold detectors,
security can still be achieved without monitoring the sig-
2nal disturbance by employing a passive delay change at
Bob’s measurement site [28]. In this paper, we exploit a
detector-decoy (DD) method that estimates the photon
statistics provided by combining a threshold detector to-
gether with a variable attenuator (amplitude modulator)
[29] to give the bounds to the fraction of detected events
by Bob from single photons. Through simulation and
comparison with Ref.[28], we show that with the pho-
ton statistics obtained, we have provided a more advan-
tageous method for feasibly realizing the RRDPS-QKD
with an enhancement in the key rate results.
II. METHOD
A. RRDPS-QKD protocol
The basic procedures of the RRDPS-QKD protocol are
as follows. First, Alice generates a series of pulse trains,
each train with a overall random phase. Then, for each
train, Alice prepares L weak coherent pulses with the bit
information encoded in their phases sk,
|ψ〉 =
L⊗
k=1
|(−1)skα〉 =
L⊗
k=1
(−1)sknˆk |α〉, (1)
where sk ∈ {0, 1}, nˆk is the photon number operator for
the kth pulse, α is related to the average photon num-
ber per pulse with |α|2 = µ/L, where µ is the average
photon number of each train. From there, Alice sends
the quantum states to Bob through an insecure chan-
nel. At Bob’s measurement site is an unbalanced Mach-
Zehnder interferometer (MZI) with a variable delay at
the long arm, which is controlled by a random number
generator (RNG). He uses the RNG to generate a num-
ber r ∈ {1, ..., L−1}, and after some possible intervention
from Eve, Bob detects the signal and acquires the indices
{i, j}, where i satisfies j = i ± r(modL), and announces
them via a public channel to Alice. In practice, the out-
puts of the MZI are adjusted so that superposed pulses
of the same phase go to a detector 0, while pulses of op-
posite phases go to a detector 1. Thus, Alice records her
sifted key as sA = si ⊕ sj . A schematic diagram of the
protocol is shown in Fig.1. Ideally, Bob’s measurement
outcomes sB should equal sA, though in reality it may
include some errors. As Bob’s random choice is after
Eve’s disturbance, the information leaked to Eve is very
limited because of information causality [30]. Intuitively,
Eve seems to have some control over the generation of
index i, though it was shown by a virtual measurement
scheme proposed in Ref.[10] that her control is in fact
rather limited. Therefore, it is possible to ignore the sig-
nal disturbance and analyze errors, namely the privacy
amplification, based only on the outcomes of Alice and
Bob. A crucial condition for the guarantee of this proto-
col is for Bob to only declare a detection event successful
when one photon is exactly detected by his detector and
no other detection occurs along the rest of the pulse.
FIG. 1: (Color online) Basic setup of a detector-decoy
RRDPS-QKD. IM, intensity modulator; PM, phase modu-
lator; r, the variable delay that generates random numbers
from 0 to L − 1. Here, IM2 realizes Bob’s detector-decoy
method, PM1 adds a random phase on each pulse train, and
PM2 encodes random phases 0 or pi on each pulse.
In the following, we show how the single photon detec-
tion condition is satisfied with our simple detector-decoy
method under current technology.
B. Detector-decoy method
The detector-decoy method, termed by Moroder et
al [29] to emphasize its connection and applicability in
QKD, is outlined thus. Suppose an initial phase random-
ized signal state (written as a classical mixture of Fock
states) of ρin =
∑∞
n=0 pn|n〉〈n| [31], with
∑∞
n=0 pn = 1
and n being the photon number, passes through inten-
sity modulator (IM) with a transmittance η, and is de-
tected by a threshold detector. The detection operation
can be characterized by two operators, receiving no pho-
tons that results in no clicks Fvac(η), and receiving at
least one photon giving exactly one click Fclick(η), where
Fvac(η) =
∑∞
n=0(1−η)
n|n〉〈n| and Fclick(η) = 1−Fvac(η),
1 is the unit operator. Therefore, the probability of re-
ceiving no clicks is pvac(η) = Tr[Fvac(η)ρin] =
∑∞
n=0(1 −
η)npn. Notice that if we were to variate the transmit-
tance η = {η1, η2, η3, ..., ηM}, in principle, we would be
able to obtain a sufficient set of linear functions to solve
the unknown parameters, the photon probabilities pn,
thereby attaining the received photon number statistics,
pvac(η1) =
∞∑
n=0
(1 − η1)
npn
... (2)
pvac(ηM ) =
∞∑
n=0
(1 − ηM )
npn.
In an actual setting, for the detector’s imperfec-
tions, such as finite detection efficiency ηd and a dark
count probability ǫ, we modify the operator Fvac(η) as
Fvac(η) = (1− ǫ)
∑∞
n=0(1− ηηd)
n|n〉〈n|, and pvac(η) will
take the form of pvac(η) = (1 − ǫ)
∑∞
n=0(1 − ηηd)
npn.
Following the ideal detector case, we can also vary the
transmittance of the IM to obtain a set of linear func-
3tions to deduce the values of pn and thus gain the signal
photon number statistics.
C. Key rate
With the detector-decoy method, we obtain the sig-
nal photon number statistics required for the RRDPS
protocol key rate generation. In our simulation model,
we vary the transmittance of Bob’s detector three times,
η = {η1, η2, η3}, specifically η1 = 1, η2 = 0.8, η3 = 0.6, so
that the probabilities of receiving clicks can be written
as
T1 = 1− (1− pd)
10∑
i=0
(1− η1ηd)
ipi,
T2 = 1− (1− pd)
10∑
i=0
(1− η2ηd)
ipi,
T3 = 1− (1− pd)
10∑
i=0
(1− η3ηd)
ipi,
(3)
with pd as the total dark count probability of each train
and ηd as the detector efficiency. Here, we assume that
events in which the signals received by Bob that involve
more than 10 photons are highly improbable and thus
ignored. Next, we calculate a related value, the rate of
detection Qk can be directly measured experimentally.
Following methods of the decoy state QKD [4, 5], we
have
Y ki = 1− (1 − pd)(1 − ηtηkηd)
i,
Qk =
∞∑
i=0
e−µ
µi
i!
Y ki
= 1− (1 − pd)e
−µηtηkηd ,
(4)
where k = 1, 2, 3 and ηt = 10
−βd/10 is the efficiency of
transmission related to the transmission distance d and
β is the channel loss rate of the fiber. Clearly, with each
attenuation of ηk, Qk should equal the corresponding
probability Tk of receiving a click in the detector, and
therefore this will be used as constraints in subsequent
calculations. In the RRDPS protocol, Bob only declares
a detection event successful when single photons are reg-
istered by his PNR detector, and the multiphoton signals
received are discarded. Here, we consider a more realistic
scenario, in which despite signals of multiphotons created
by the source or the eavesdropper, throughout transmis-
sion and detection, only one photon from each multipho-
ton signal pulse survives for registration at the detector,
while all other photons are lost, mathematically put as
a minimum of a single photon transmission probability
function,
G =
10∑
n=0
nηd(1− ηd)
n−1pn, (5)
under the constraints that Qk = Tk for k = 1, 2, 3, where
the photon number probabilities pn satisfy
∑10
n=0 pn = 1
and 0 ≤ pn ≤ 1. Meanwhile, in general QKD protocols,
the length of secure key K1 is obtained after subtract-
ing the bits used for error reconciliation and privacy am-
plification [10], written as K1 = N [1 − fHER − HPA],
where N is the length of the sifted key, HER and HPA
are the costs for error reconciliation and privacy am-
plification, respectively, and f is the parameter related
to the efficiency of the employed error correction code.
In standard calculations, it holds that HER = h(eb)
and HPA = h(eph), where h(x) is the Shannon entropy
h(x) = −x log2 x− (1−x) log2(1−x), eb and eph are the
bit error rate and phase error rate. In our computations,
we inspect specifically the key rate per pulse, with its
formula written as [10]
K2 =
1
L
(
Gmin −Qfh(eb)−
[
esrc
+ (Gmin − esrc)h
( vth
L− 1
)])
,
(6)
where Q is the overall gain, Gmin is the lower bound of
Eq.(5), and esrc is a constant associated with the prob-
ability of finding more than vth photons in each pulse,
written as [10]
P (n > vth) ≤ esrc = 1−
vth∑
i=0
e−µ
µi
i!
. (7)
As we can see, the second and third terms in Eq.(6) are
the error correction and privacy amplification terms, re-
spectively.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
In our simulation, the exact forms ofQ and eb in Eq.(6)
can be given by [32]
Q = 1− (1− pd)e
−µηtηd ,
eb = [ed(1− pd)(1− e
−µηtηd) +
1
2
pd]/Q,
(8)
where ed as the system error probability, and the
RRDPS-QKD experimental parameters [14] used are
listed in Table I.
TABLE I: Key parameters for simulation.
pd ηd ed f β(dB/km)
1× 10−9L 19% 1.5% 1.16 0.2
Considering the worst case of the lower bound of G,
where only one photon from each pulse of multiphoton
signals survives transmission for registration at the detec-
tor, we optimize parameters µ, the average photon num-
ber of each train, and vth, the threshold photon number
4FIG. 2: The optimized secret key rate per pulse for (a)
L = 128 and (b) L = 16 in logarithmic scale as a function
of the transmission distance. Our results (solid lines) show
that after full optimization of the signal state µ and threshold
photon number vth for each value of distance, the detector-
decoy-based RRDPS-QKD gives higher optimal key rates and
longer performance distances than the methods proposed in
[28], depicted as the dashed lines. In order to obtain nonzero
key rates with our method at the transmission distance limit
of 290 km for L = 128, µ and vth were optimized to 4.895 and
20 respectively, and 0.0535 and 3 respectively for L = 16 at
the transmission distance limit of 200 km.
via a local search algorithm [33] to obtain the optimal
key rate per pulse K2 as a function of transmission dis-
tance. The results are shown as the solid lines in Fig.2,
for L = 128 and 16, from which we can see, our DD-
RRDPS-QKD is an experimentally realizable protocol
with desirable performance. We also give the full pa-
rameter optimized results of the recent implementation
of RRDPS also using threshold detectors with a passive
delay change [28] with the same simulation experimen-
tal parameters as our model (shown as the dashed lines
in Fig.2) for comparison, where the key rate per pulse
function K3 is given as Eq.(2) of Ref.[28]
K3 =
1
L
(
Q−Qfh(eb)
−
[
esrc + (Q − esrc)h
(2vth
L
)])
.
(9)
As one can see, our results offer significant improvement
FIG. 3: The optimized secret key rate per pulse for DD-
RRDPS (solid lines) and BB84 with infinite decoy states [32]
(dash-dotted lines) in logarithmic scale as a function of the
transmission distance when L = 128. (a) The key rates for
ed = 1.5%. (b) The key rates for ed = 9.5%.
in both key rate and transmission distance for a given
pulse number L compared with the methods proposed in
[28]. Moreover, when L becomes fewer, the advantages
of our method become more prominent, as it offers more
than one order of magnitude higher key rate per pulse at
shorter distances to over two orders of magnitude higher
key rate per pulse for longer distances, and greater per-
formance distance of almost more than 50 km compared
to [28].
Furthermore, we give a comparison between our DD-
RRDPS with conventional decoy-state BB84 [32], shown
in Fig.3. As one can see, when ed is small, the decoy-
state BB84 outperforms the RRDPS, while as ed becomes
larger, the advantages of RRDPS becomes more promi-
nent. This can be explained by that while ed is small,
pd plays a significant role in QBER, and since RRDPS
encodes only one bit on L pulses, the total detector dark
count probability magnifies greatly and the average pho-
ton number per pulse decreases significantly, therefore
limiting its transmission distance and secret key rate,
whereas BB84 encodes one bit per pulse. However, when
ed becomes very large, it will cost a very large portion
of the key for privacy amplification in the BB84-QKD
protocol, while for RRDPS-QKD, because of its high tol-
5erance of errors, privacy amplification has nothing to do
with the bit error rate. Therefore, the RRDPS greatly
surpasses decoy-state BB84 given that the bit error rate
is very large.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have proposed a DD-RRDPS-QKD
protocol that by using a threshold detector and a vari-
able attenuator, a practical experimental implementation
of RRDPS with desirable key rate and transmission dis-
tance has been achieved. With our simulation results, we
have given the bounds to the fraction of detected events
by Bob from single photons and proved our work to be
an experimentally realizable RRDPS protocol with better
performance, even in the worst scenario of only one pho-
ton from the entire weak signal of multiphoton pulses is
detected by the detector, and have shown that the results
obtained in our protocol greatly surpasses recent works.
Thus, an immediately feasible experimental solution of
the RRDPS-QKD protocol under current technology is
offered requiring only threshold single-photon detectors.
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